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ABSTRACT The focus of the analysis is attachment to Europe and Croatia as an in-
direct measure of identity. Variables used to explain these different attachments are 
demographic, social and ideological. The attachment to Croatia is best explained 
by the ideological variables, with those being more nationalistic, religious, socially 
conservative having a closer attachment to Croatia. Closeness to Europe, on the 
other hand, is more determined by social variables like occupational position. Peo-
ple with a higher position within the division of labour and decision-making proc-
esses feel closer to Europe compared with those lower down on the occupational 
scale.
We have found positive correlation between the attachments to Europe and Croatia. 
The attachment to Europe does not replace the national identification but can be 
seen as a part of the process of the broadening of the identity space. The European 
identification is not in contradiction with the national identification, but rather an 
expansion of it.
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1. Identification with Europe
The processes of European integration played an important role in the shaping 
of discourses in the former Yugoslavia. Could Yugoslavia integrate with Europe 
in spite of the fact that it was a socialist state? To what extent did the socialist 
system presents an obstacle to participation in the European integration? We can 
argue that the “West-East” division within Yugoslavia was also the dividing line 
of the sense of belonging to Europe. In the western part (Slovenia and Croatia), 
being part of Yugoslavia was perceived as an obstacle for participation in the Eu-
ropean integration. The “belonging to Europe” was evoked as an “inborn” cultural 
trait of the people in the western parts of Yugoslavia in the intellectual debates 
that included the revival of the idea of “Mitteleurope”. In such constructs in the 
western parts of Yugoslavia, “Yugoslavism” was abandoned and replaced by Eu-
ropeanism. Ethnic nationalism with its anti-Communist dimension was regarded 
as something that made the “western republics” of Slovenia and Croatia closer to 
Western Europe. As formulated by the first post-communist Croatian president 
Franjo Tuđman, “Croats belong to a different culture – a different civilization 
from the Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean 
tradition.... The Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks 
and Albanians. They belong to the Byzantine culture... Despite the similarities in 
language we cannot be together” (Viorst, 1991:74). The promoters of the ethno-
nationalism were not aware of the prevailing anti-nationalist sentiment in that 
same Europe (Sekulić, 2001:158–59) to which they wanted to belong. They were 
not able to grasp the distinction between the support for those who were per-
ceived as victims in the “wars of succession” in Yugoslavia and the rejection of 
ethno-nationalist claims in any form. European support was not about promot-
ing one nationalism against another, but was for anti-Communist liberation and 
pro-European sentiment against communism and ethno-nationalism. Thus, after 
the first enthusiasm for Europe among the Croatian nationalists, the period of 
“awakening” followed and differentiation ensued in which ethno-nationalism and 
“Europeanism” parted. In that first phase Croatian nationalism and Europeanism, 
in the minds of nationalistic oriented Croats, had gone hand in hand. Croatia was 
“returning” to its European roots and was extricating itself from the “unnatural” 
Yugoslav community. However after the disappointments with the tepid Euro-
pean response to Milosevic policies during the war, and to the requests, after the 
war, to extradite the people accused of the war crimes, a new questioning about 
Europe was emerging. The nationalists were asking the question whether the 
national independence from Yugoslavia was achieved just in order to surrender 
their sovereignty to Europe? In the nationalist discourse, Europe was transformed 
from the positive pole of attraction to the negative image of supranational entity 
endangering the achieved independence. Those engaged in this discourse started 
to perceive more and more the European supra-nationality as an equivalent to the 
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2. The problem and hypotheses formulation
In this paper the focus of the analysis are expressed attachments to different levels 
of territorial-political configurations: village, town or city, county, region, Croatia, 
South East Europe and Europe. Identity is measured indirectly as an attachment 
to different spatial configurations, but it indicates, nevertheless, the potential of 
solidarity and mobilization. The first question we ask is a descriptive one. To what 
extent is the person attached to different levels of territorial, political and cultural 
configurations? The nationalist interpretation of identity claims that the national 
identification must have privileged status among different identities. We will sim-
ply check the intensity of attachment to different levels of territorial and political 
constructs: from the place of living to nation and to Europe.
Understanding the relationship between the attachment to Croatia and to Europe 
will help us explore to what extent people feel attached to one or other level of 
these political-cultural configurations. The national attachment is generally strong-
er than supra-national (European) attachment in all European countries. In Eu-
robarometer surveys the same questions are used as in our present survey. The 
results show that the attachment to Europe is growing in time (from 1991 to 2000) 
and significantly varies between countries. The numbers of people saying that 
they are “somewhat” or “very” attached to Europe in 2000 are greatest in Sweden 
(77%), Spain (72%) and Luxemburg (80%) and lowest in United Kingdom (42%) 
and Greece (44%). On the other hand attachment to the nation is much higher 
but stagnating over time. It is highest in Denmark (96%) and lowest in Belgium 
and Netherlands (81%) (Citrin and Sides, 2004). Croatia would be likely to follow 
the same pattern. The only question can be to what extent the recent national 
emancipation and war of national liberation “increased” the difference in favour of 
national (Croatian) identification.
From this analysis we can formulate several hypotheses regarding the attachments 
to different levels of territorial configurations. In accordance with the research 
in other European countries and especially taking into account the high levels 
of nationalist mobilization in the period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
formation of national states, we can expect high levels of association with the 
national (Croatian) level. Identification with supra-national levels would be lower. 
Especially the identification with South Eastern Europe will be low because of the 
negative connotations of the image of the Balkans in Croatia as a “counterpoint” of 
the “belonging to Europe” (Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004; Rihtman-Auguštin, 1997).
The second hypothesis probes the interrelationships between different levels of 
attachments. Here we can start from different theoretical perspectives. One is 
classical Durkhemian evolutionary optimism. In such a vision, the broadening of 
identity is perceived as a constant march toward the more inclusive identity. As 
society spreads over a vaster surface, the common conscience is obliged to rise 
above local diversities, to dominate more territory and, consequently, to become 
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versal identity – the attachment to humanity being the most important human 
attachment. In Durkheim’s evolutionary view the “patria” is the highest level of 
complexity with which people can identify at the achieved evolutionary stage. 
Localism and regionalism are replaced with patriotism (“a sentiment that joins the 
individual to the political society”). The next step in that evolution will be the re-
placement of patriotism with the sentiment of attachment to humanity in general 
(Durkheim, 1986). Very similar to the classical Durkhemian theory is Inglehart’s 
concept of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Inglehart claims that 
with modern educational, political and cultural developments, individuals are 
more capable of identifying with more abstract political communities. For Dur-
kheim the highest community people could identify with in his time was patria. 
But he projects the possibilities of future evolution of identification until the 
individual starts to identify with the whole of humanity. In Inglehart’s thinking, 
people committed to one abstract community (nation) may be ready to commit 
to other political abstract communities (Europe), providing that no conflicts exist 
between these different objects of identification. Durkhemian evolutionary theory 
and Inglehart’s cognitive mobilization combined with the Croatian ideology of 
“belonging to Europe” would predict no contradiction between the European and 
Croatian identifications. If these assumptions are correct, these two identifications 
can be regarded as simple “stages” on the path of the gradual expansion of iden-
tification levels. As in the past local identities were gradually replaced by “higher” 
and more embracing national identities, so today’s national identities are on the 
way to be replaced by the “higher” supra-national, in this case the European, 
identity. The replacement does not mean the disappearance. The regional identi-
ties did not disappear when replaced by the national identity; they simply became 
less dominant in the whole spectrum of identities characterizing every individual. 
However we can formulate an opposing hypothesis concerning the inherent ten-
sions between Croatian and supra-national identification. In that perspective the 
identification with Europe is not viewed as a simple extension of the Croatian 
identification but is in contradiction with it. In the same way, during the existence 
of Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav identity was in some kind of contradiction with the 
ethno-national (Serbian, Croatian and other) identities (Sekulić, Hodson, Massey, 
1994). European identification can be comprehended as a functional equivalent 
of the lost Yugoslav identity. Namely, with the disappearance of Yugoslavia, the 
chance of supranational, Yugoslav identification was lost. The European identity 
can be perceived as a replacement for the lost supranational Yugoslav identi-
fication. In that case European identification would be in opposition, and not 
an extension of the Croatian identification. We can than perceive the European 
/ Croatian dichotomy resembling the Civic / Ethnic dichotomy (Sekulić, 1997; 
2004). In that perspective Yugoslavism is viewed as a form of civic identity coun-
terpoised to ethno-national identifications. After its disappearance, its functional 
equivalent becomes civic European identification.
If that hypothesis is correct we can formulate an additional hypothesis that these 
identifications are parts of broader ideological orientations. Where strong Croatian 
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ropean identification can be viewed as a part of a broader cosmopolitan-civic 
orientation. In that case the Croatian orientation would be part of the conservative 
value system and more correlated with variables that are connected with it (lower 
education, rural origin etc.). Opposite to this, European identification will be part 




The data used here were collected as part of the “South East European Social Sur-
vey” under the leadership of Prof Albert Simkus. The Norwegian research council 
financed the survey. The data were collected using door-to-door interviews on 
the representative sample of the Croatian population, N=2500. Because the split 
sample design was used, the variables used are from only one half of the sample 
with N of 1250. The data were collected by the “Puls” agency, Zagreb. The whole 
project included all the countries and territories of the former Yugoslavia (minus 
Slovenia plus Albania). Here, we limit our analysis only to the Croatian data. The 
data were collected in January 2004.
Variables
The dependent variable “attachment to the place” was derived from the question 
“How close do you feel to the following places? Some people love their home vil-
lage and identify themselves as a person from there. Others don’t feel so close to 
their village, but instead more to the region of the country, the whole country, or 
their region of the world.” The level of identification with the six levels of territori-
al-political configurations was probed: the village, city or town, county (županija 
in Croatia), the region of the country, Croatia, South-East Europe and Europe. Four 
levels of intensity of attachment to every territorial-cultural level were offered: very 
close, close, not very close, and not close at all. The “can’t choose” alternative was 
also available.
The independent variables are comprised of three groups. The first group are the 
standard demographic variables of gender and age, while the second group of vari-
ables indicate the social position of the respondent such as education, occupations, 
household income, place of residence and nationality.
Education comprises seven levels starting with no schooling as the lowest and 
PhD and MA as the highest. Occupation is in the form of a five-point scale starting 
from farmers, continuing with blue-collar workers, white-collar employees, profes-
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income is grouped in seventeen categories with increments of 999 kuna’s and 
place of residence is grouped into eight categories depending on the number of in-
habitants. The respondents were asked for nationality self-identification. Because 
of the high level of ethnic homogeneity of Croatia, we divided the whole sample 
into Croats (90.6% of the sample) and non-Croats (8.5%).
The third group of independent variables are based on the statements of the re-
spondents regarding nationalism, social conservatism, isolationism, religiosity, and 
the feeling of pride in being Croat. (Full wording of all items for all scales is given 
in the Appendix.)
The nationalism scale (based on 16 items having Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.893) is 
designed to measure national sentiment and is based on a set of statements about 
nationalist values like “Survival of our nation should be the main goal of every 
individual”, and “The common origin of our people is the basis of social trust”. 
It also includes several statements about how well nationalities can get along like 
“Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nationality” 
or “Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust”.
The second is the scale of social conservatism based on four items measuring at-
titudes toward abortion, pre-marital sexual relations, divorce and homosexuality. 
Cronbach’s Alpha of the scale is 0.798.
The isolationism scale is based on the support for measures like limiting foreign-
ers’ ability to buy real estate in Croatia, a statement that international organizations 
are taking too much power from the national government, and the like. Altogether 
there were six such items with Alpha 0.726.
The measurement of religiosity is based on the self-placement of the respondent 
on the scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious).
We also have a separate scale of “being proud to be Croat.” It comprises four items 
in the form that the “world will be better if all people would be like Croats”, or 
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4. Results
Attachment to different levels
Table 1
How close do you feel to the following places?
Not close 
at all
Not very close Close Very close Total
N % N % N % N % N %
Close to village, town or city  20 1.6  88  7.0 455 36.4 681 54.5 1244 99.5
Close to your county  38 3.0 175 14.0 563 45.0 447 35.8 1223 97.8
Close to your region  31 2.5 157 12.6 541 43.3 496 39.7 1225 98.0
Close to Croatia  10  .8  76  6.1 448 35.8 702 56.2 1236 98.9
Close to Southeast Europe 315 25.2 414 33.1 352 28.2 104  8.3 1185 94.8
Close to Europe 220 17.6 322 25.8 463 37.0 193 15.4 1198 95.8
The results (Table 1) are clearly showing that people in Croatia feel the strongest 
attachment to the national level (Croatia) with 56.2% of respondents expressing 
very close attachment to it, followed by 54.5% expressing a very close attachment 
to their village, city or town. The middle level of attachment is felt to the county 
(35.5% feeling very close) and to the region (39.7% feeling very close). The third 
group is obviously Europe (with 15.4% feeling very close) and Southeast Europe 
(with only 8.3% very close). These results are not substantially different from the 
earlier quoted Eurobarometer data. The closeness to the nation (summing close 
and very close responses) is within the same range as in the Western European 
nations (around 90%). Even expressed closeness to Europe is within the range 
characterizing the populations of the European Union members. Although it is on 
the lower end of the range, it is for example higher than in Greece or Great Britain 
in 2000 (Citrin and Sides, 2004).
We can conclude that our initial hypothesis is confirmed. People in general feel 
much closer to the national level than to the supranational levels. The closeness 
to South East Europe is an outlier with much weaker attachment than to all other 
levels. The national and sub-national attachments are much higher than the supra-
national. Also local attachment (to the place of living) is on the same level as the 
attachment to the national (Croatia) level. The initial result is that the closeness to 
different territorial-political levels differs mostly in accordance with the expectati-
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Graph 1
Close to vilage, town or city
Close to your county
Close to southeast Europe
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We must be aware that the distribution of results reflects also the method used in 
obtaining the data. The fact that people were asked to rate and not to rank their 
levels of closeness to the different territorial-cultural levels produced the possibility 
that they could express equal closeness to all levels. When discussing the contro-
versy between rating and ranking, Inglehart says; “It is perfectly true that most pe-
ople would like to eat their cake and have it too –and this poses no problem when 
no choice is necessary” (Inglehart, 1997:115). Thus Inglehart’s statement is intended 
to justify ranking as a better and more realistic technique reflecting real life where 
we are forced to make choices. Taking into account this ranking-rating debate and 
the determination of the results by the technique employed, let us emphasize two 
conclusions. First, that in spite of the fact that people were not forced to choose or 
rank their responses, the majority of respondents did make some choices. Substan-
tial numbers of people varied their responses and indicated that they felt more 
attached to some levels than to others. Thus we can explore the different patterns 




Not close Close to
Closeness to 
Croatia
Not close 1 Not close to any (5.6%) 2 Close to Europe (1.0%)
Close to 3 Close to Croatia(37.5%) 4 Close to both (51.4%)
In the first cell we find respondents who did not express closeness to any of the 
territorial levels. They were not very close, or not close at all to Europe and to 
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close to) but at the same time were saying that they were not close to Croatia 
(not close or not close at all). We can see that only 1% of the sample fits into that 
category. Opposite to them are those who are close to Croatia but not to Europe 
(37.5% of the sample). Finally, the largest category is composed of those expressing 
closeness to Croatia and to Europe (51.4%).
Based on this typology, we can derive a second conclusion, that if unconstrained 
by a ranking system, a large proportion of people chooses to express an equal 
attachment to more than one level of identity, which provides an interesting con-
tradiction of loyalties. But it is equally telling that only 1% of the sample is ex-
pressing closer attachment to Europe than to Croatia. We must be aware that the 
distribution of “types” would probably be very different if ranking instead of rating 
was used. In 1995, the World Value Survey in Croatia used a ranking instead of 
a rating system and respondents were forced to make a first and second choice 
among the same levels used in the present research. Under such conditions 80.5% 
of respondents chose sub-national levels (from village to the city) as their level 
of closest attachment, 15.5%, and 3.5% chose two offered supra-national levels 
(Sekulić, 1997; 2004). That means probably when forced to choose, large number 
of respondents, who are now expressing equal attachment to Croatia and to the 
lower levels (village or city levels), will choose the lower level as the object of most 
intensive attachment.2
The second question is can we detect that identification with different levels ex-
presses some underlying tensions? Looking at the intercorrelations between at-
tachments to different levels of territorial-political configurations we can observe 
a positive correlation among all levels, except between the two most distant ones, 
Europe and the most local. That is the only cell where correlation does not reach 
the statistical significance.
Table 3












Close to village, town or city .568(**) .477(**) .377(**) .084(**) .046
Close to your county 1 .695(**) .409(**) .240(**) .213(**)
Close to your region 1 .514(**) .239(**) .220(**)
Close to Croatia 1 .169(**) .246(**)
Close to Southeast Europe 1 .651(**)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
2 Similar results were obtained by Banovac (2004) for regional samples of Istria, Lika and 
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These correlations are to certain extent the result of the unconstrained nature of 
the rating technique. It is easy to express attachment to all levels and not to make 
choices. But in spite of this unconstrained nature of the rating technique we can 
clearly detect a pattern. The correlation coefficients among national and sub-
national levels are much higher than among these levels and two supra-national 
levels. The range for the correlation coefficients of expressed attachments among 
national and sub-national levels is from .377 (local and Croatia) to .695 county 
and region. On the other hand the correlation between attachment to Europe 
and to the village is statistically insignificant and between Europe and Croatia is 
only .246.
The South East Europe/Europe correlation is high .651. From these prevailing high 
correlation coefficients can be concluded that the first, “cognitive mobilization” 
hypothesis is corroborated. But on the other hand, taking into account the uncon-
strained character of the rating technique and the emerging pattern of different 
magnitudes of correlation levels among different levels of political-territorial con-
figurations, the possibility for further analysis opens.
This conclusion that there are different associations among different “subgroups” 






Close to village, town or city .788 –.089
Close to your county .843  .145
Close to your region .832  .186
Close to Croatia .680  .195
Close to Southeast Europe .119  .888
Close to Europe .107  .903
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
The factor analysis gives a clear two-component solution. These two factors ex-
plain 70.316% of the total variance. Initial conclusions from the inspection of the 
correlation matrix are confirmed. There is a clear tendency for the attachment to 
different national-sub-national levels and for the two supra-national levels to be 
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reflect two underlying “basic” attachments.3 The correlation between the factors is 
.229. These two groupings of attachments are also clearly visible on the Compo-
nent Plot in Rotated Space.
Graph 2
 





















Component Plot in Rotated Space
Legend: B066A = close to village B067A = close to the municipality
 B068A = close to the region B069A = close to Croatia
 B070A = close to South East Europe Bo71A = close to Europe
3 We will not discuss here the difference that is usually obtained in rotated and unrotated 
solutions. The Unrotated solution (not shown here) is indicating one more general factor 
(component) and the second more “specific” factor with all variables having loadings on 
the first factor. This result is to a large extent a consequence of the rating method used. 
As stated by Inglehart “... the rating method tends to produce a one-dimensional solution: 
insofar as it encourages response set, it produces a first principal component on which 
everything is positively correlated with everything else, regardless of content, so that all 
items have high positive loading on the first principal component” (Inglehart, 1997:115) 
The rotated solution does not show general and specific factors but two principal factors 
(E. A. Pedhazur, L. P. Pedhazur, 1991:607–622). For our purposes, the eventual distinction 
between some “general attachment” component and “specific” (in our case “supranational” 
attachment component) is irrelevant and probably only a statistical artefact of the rating 
method used. What is important is that, according to our hypothesis, we can clearly distin-
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The two-factor solution indicates that the tendencies towards national-sub-national 
and supranational identifications are reflecting different underlying factors. In ac-
cordance with the second hypothesis, these two attachments are belonging to dif-
ferent underlying value systems. Those more attached to national and sub-national 
levels are more conservative and those expressing attachment to the supra-national 
levels are more liberal in their world views. Let us examine whether this hypoth-
esis can be empirically confirmed. In order to explore the second hypothesis about 
the ideological structure underlying different attachment levels, we turn first to the 
correlations among all analyzed variables.
Table 5
Correlates of different attachments4
National closeness Close to S. E. Europe Close to Europe
National closeness4 1 .230 (.000) .226(.000)
Close to S.E. Europe X 1 .651(.000)
Close to Europe X X 1
Demographic 
Gender  .029(.307)  .037(.208) –.028(.324)
Age  .226(.000)  .024 (.410)  .007(.812)
Nationality –.078(.006)  .065(.025)  .030(.302)
Social position
Education –.150(.000) –.042(.078)  .031 (.187)
Occupation –.041(.197) –.034(.303)  .074(.022)
Household income –.042(.184) –.038(.236)  .075(.018)
Ideological scales
Religiosity  .116(.000) –.043 (.138) –.072(.013)
Left-Right  .127 (.000) –.043(.198) –.019(.575)
Isolationism  .177 (.000)  .021(.462) –.014(.618)
Conservatism  .101(.000) –.005(.834) –.026(.255)
Proud to be Croat  .211(.000) –.005(.833)  .015(.517)
Nationalism  .167(.000)  .003 (.907) –.009(.669)
Pearson Correlation coefficients with Significance (2-tailed) in parenthesis.
4 In order to simplify further analysis we created a scale of national-sub-national 
closeness based on expressed attachments to four levels (from village to Croatia). 
It has a satisfactory reliability (Cronbach alpha =.805). This was not possible to 
























D. Sekulić, Ž. Šporer: European and Croatian Identity: Cognitive Mobilization or Latent Confict
The main hypothesis that the ideological factors are underpinning the expressed 
attachments is confirmed regarding the national-sub-national attachments. All 
ideological scales indicating “conservative” direction are positively correlated 
with national-sub-national closeness. The more religious people are closer to the 
national and sub-national levels as are those positioning themselves towards the 
right on the left-right political scale. Such correlations do not exist in the case 
of the two supra-national levels. Although in most cases the coefficients have 
negative signs they do not reach statistical significance. From this we can derive 
the conclusion that the closeness to the national-sub-national level is a part of 
the general conservative ideological orientation. At the same time it cannot be 
claimed that the more intensive closeness to the supra-national levels indicates 
less conservative or more liberal orientations although the negative signs of the 
correlation coefficients indicate that direction. In any case the supranational at-
tachments are much less ideologically determined than the national-sub-national 
ones.
On the other hand, scales measuring ideological orientations are not significant-
ly correlated with supra-national attachments (with the only exception of religi-
osity which is negatively correlated with closeness to Europe). However the two 
social position indicators of household income and occupational position are 
significantly correlated with the attachment variables with those having higher 
income and higher occupational position expressing more intensive closeness 
to Europe (not to South East Europe). These findings indicate that national-sub-
national closeness is ideologically determined and closeness to Europe is more 
under the influence of social position. Those having higher occupational posi-
tion (and income) are probably in a better position to reap the benefits of the 
international economy, and are more likely to be internationally oriented than 
those who are on the lower social positions. Their higher position allows them 
to perceive the benefits of integration with Europe and also enables them to 
create more internal or personal images of belonging to a wider identity rather 
than only a national one.
There is a difference between our data and that of the Eurobarometer (Citrin 
and Sides, 2004). In our data older people are more attached to the national-sub-
national level but there is no age difference in the attachment to Europe. European 
data show that younger people are more attached to Europe than older people, 
but this is not the case among our Croatian sample. The only factor correlated with 
expressed closeness to South-East Europe is non-Croatian nationality. That is not 
surprising if we take into account that half of the non-Croats have origins or at 
least an “imagined” origin in South-Eastern Europe, and for them this (as in the 
case of many Croatian Serbs) is their homeland. However Croats would appear to 
hold the negative image of the Balkans referred to earlier, and reject any identifica-
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5. Regression analysis
In order to elaborate on the bivariate findings, a regression analysis was performed 
to check on the causality and interrelationship among the variables. The first ob-
servation is that in all tables the explained variance is very small. It is greatest in 
the case of the national / sub-national closeness as dependent variable while in 
the case of the two supra-national attachments the variance is less than 1%. That 
means that some variables and constellations outside of our models5 may be con-
tributing to or causing the variations in the closeness variables.
Table 6
Regression on National and Sub-national Closeness
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Demographics
Gender  .030 .374  .014 .697 –.003 .941 –.001 .986  .018 .611
Age  .186 .000  .190 .000  .185 .000  .149 .001  .145 .000
Nationality –.068 .086 –.037 .351 –.040 .253
Social position
Occupation –.042 .348 –.041 .358 –.027 .599 –.013 .786
Education –.046 .325 –.022 .636 –.005 .920  .008 .879
Home income  .073 .060  .082 .038  .072 .099  .075 .081  .051 .163
Ideological scales
Religiosity  .091 .011  .038 .399  .006 .896  .006 .886
Left-Right  .093 .033  .029 .520  .029 .473
Proud  .142 .002  .184 .000
Conservatism –.073 .110 –.025 .201
Nationalism  .145 .005  .099 .036
Isolationism  .021 .643  .035 .393
R square .040 .045 .049 .094 .105
R square (adjusted) .034 .038 .037 .076 .093
5 That small explained variance is also characterizing Butler’s (2004) pilot study in which 
the reported explained variance is of the same magnitude as ours. Butler’s explanation is 
that the suppressed variance arises from independent variables where only student popu-
lations were used. In our case we can argue that the unconstrained nature of the rating 
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Returning to the explanatory power of individual independent variables, we can 
create here a more precise picture than from the bivariate correlations. If we look 
first at the model 1 for the national-sub-national closeness we can get a clearer 
picture of the ideological and social determinants. First only two ideological scales 
retain significance when all ideological variables are simultaneously included – the 
nationalism and the ‘proud to be Croat’ scales. Other conservative variables are act-
ing through them on the national-sub-national closeness. A causal model explain-
ing the pattern of relationships among ideological scales can be constructed. When 
only religiosity is added to the social position variables it has significant influence 
on our dependent variable. When left-right orientation is added to the model it is 
significant but religiosity loses its significance. That suggests that religiosity influ-
ences political orientation (the more religious are more right oriented), with the 
bivariate correlation between religiosity and right political orientation being 0.419 
and significant, and political orientation influences the dependent variable. When 
all other ideological variables are added to the model, nationalism and the ‘proud 
to be Croat scale’ are significant and right political orientation loses significance. 
(The bivariate relationship between political orientation and nationalism is 0.432 
and significant, and between political orientation and ‘proud to be Croat’ scale 
0.324 and significant). In that way we can argue for and attempt to explain the 
causal sequence among the ideological variables. Religiosity influences right politi-
cal orientation and right political orientation increases nationalism and pride in 
the nation.
Thus we have disentangled the threads and provided a more precise explana-
tion of the causal influences among the ideological variables. It is also important 
to note that age stays an important predictor in all the presented models. Older 
people are more attached to the national-sub-national level than the younger. This 
finding corresponds to the findings of the Eurobarometer surveys (Citrin and Sydes 
2004:173) which show that younger people are also less attached to the national 
level than older ones.
One of the social status variables, household income, is also significant in some of 
the models. It is interesting to note at what point of adding new variables to the 
model it loses its significance. When we introduce right-left self-identification, the 
significance of household income is erased. This suggests that we have detected 
a causal sequence where household income is correlated with political orientation 
(the bivariate correlation is –.069 with significance of .052. The negative sign in the 
table below means that more right political identification is positively correlated 
with lower income and left with higher). This political orientation “explains’ the 
influence of income on national closeness. When it is introduced into the model, 
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Table 7
Determinants of “Closeness to Europe”
Independent Variable Beta (Significance) Beta (Significance) Beta (Significance)
Gender –.053 (.130) –.039 (.280) –.045 (.077)
Age  .001 (.989) –.005 (.889) –.021 (.626)
Nationality  .056 (.112)  .037 (.303)  .038 (.343)
Education –.044 (.356) –.058 (.231) –.077 (.156)
Household Income  .076 (.056)  .074 (.067)  .036 (.427)
Occupation  .089 (.056)  .081 (.081)  .092 (.078)
Religiosity –.063 (.095) –.100 (.032)
Left-Right  .040 (.372)
R square  .018  .020  .025
Adjusted R square  .011  .011  .012
On the other hand the explanatory power of our regression model of ‘Closeness to 
Europe’ is extremely low. The picture we obtain from using the regression model 
is somewhat different from the bivariate correlations. From the bivariate table we 
can see the positive and significant correlations of two of social status indicators, 
occupation and household income (.074 and .075 both statistically significant) and 
the negative and statistically significant correlation with religiosity. In the regres-
sion model, the significance of the two social status indicators disappears and that 
of religiosity stays. That can probably be interpreted by suggesting that household 
income and occupation are producing lower religiosity levels and this in turn in-
fluences the closeness to Europe scores. In the same way, ideological orientations 
can be interpreted as the decisive determinants of national-sub-national closeness. 
The first level correlation of the social status variables is “explained away” when 
ideological variables are introduced into the model.
Finally, the regression model for the closeness to South East Europe (not shown 
here) did not produce any new information in comparison with the bivariate cor-
relations. The only independent variable with explanatory power is the nationality 
of the respondents. Non-Croats express more closeness to South-Eastern Europe 
than Croats.
6. Discussion and conclusions
What can we conclude regarding our main dilemma of whether national-sub-
national and European attachments are in contradiction or in harmony with each 
other? Are they reflecting cognitive mobilization in Inglehart’s term or is attach-
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national identification in the same way as Yugoslavism had that function earlier? 
From the fact that there is a positive correlation between national-sub-national lev-
els and European attachment we could conclude that cognitive mobilization theory 
best describes our findings. But on a closer look the picture dramatically changes. 
First, the factor analysis clearly indicates that national-sub-national attachments 
and supranational attachments reflect two different underlying factors. That alone 
suggests that these two attachments belong to different parts of the “ideological 
space”. This preliminary conclusion is confirmed when we look at the correlation 
of these attachments to other ideological orientations. It is clear that national-
sub-national attachment is part of the conservative nationalist orientation. On the 
other hand attachment to Europe is not. Although the correlations with ideological 
attachments are not statistically significant they are all consistently pointing in a 
negative direction. The only negative correlation reaching significance is ‘religiosi-
ties’ indicating that people who express more attachment to Europe are less reli-
gious. These findings justify the interpretation of these attachments as reflecting an 
ideological stance. People who are less conservative and less nationalistic express 
more attachment to Europe, when the opposite is the case with people who are 
more conservative and nationalistic. It can be argued that expressing a stronger 
attachment to Europe is an opportunity for the people who are less attached to 
conservative ideological orientation to express their dissatisfaction with the pre-
vailing nationalist discourse. On the other hand, weak correlations reflect the 
fact that attachment to Europe in general has a positive connotation. From recent 
history, being “European” meant some kind of anticommunist and anti-Yugoslav 
declaration.
This positive image of “Europe” weakened after Europe’s wobbling response to 
the Serbian (Milosevic’s) rearrangement of the post-Tito Yugoslavia and later, after 
the European insistence on cooperation with the War Crime Tribunal in Hague. 
Attachment to South East Europe is strongest among non-Croats whose large num-
bers have ethnic ties with the area. From all of this we can conclude that attach-
ment to the nation and to the supranational entities reflect different underlying 
ideological orientations. One is more traditional and nationalistic and the other 
more cosmopolitan and pro-European. It must be emphasized that these attach-
ments are not correlated with status and demographic variables. Except for the fact 
that age is positively correlated with national-sub-national closeness, age and gen-
der are not significant explanatory variables. Also the fact that the status variables 
lose explanatory power when added to the regression model emphasizes the im-
portance of ideological orientations. That is different from our earlier findings re-
garding Yugoslav identity and civic-ethnic identification, where the determination 
of status and demographic variables was much stronger (Sekulić, Hodson, Massey, 
1994; Sekulić, 2004). Part of this difference can also be explained by the technique 
then used. Yugoslav identity was the expressed identity of the respondents; they 
were either Yugoslavs or something else. In addition the technique used then to 
measure civic-ethnic dichotomy was ranking. However, in our current study, we 
used rating measures for attachment (closeness) that did not force respondents to 
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attachment to supra-national levels. They were allowed to express equal identifica-
tion with more than one level and thus avoid choosing among them. We believe 
that if they were forced to choose, the majority of the respondents would be clas-
sified as ethnic identifiers, because they would most likely choose national over 
supranational identification.
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Europski i hrvatski identitet: Kognitivna mobilizacija ili latentni konflikt
Sažetak
U centru analize je osjećanje privrženosti Europi i Hrvatskoj kao indirektna mjera identiteta. 
U objašnjavanju raznih oblika privrženosti korištene su demografske, socijalne i ideološke 
varijable. Privrženost Hrvatskoj najbolje je objašnjena ideološkim varijablama – oni koji 
ističu svoju nacionalnost, koji su religiozniji, konzervativniji osjećaju veću povezanost s 
Hrvatskom. S druge strane bliskost Europi više je determinirana socijalnim varijablama, 
kao na primjer socijalnim statusom i položajem u zanimanju. Ljudi koji imaju viši položaj u 
društvu i zanimanju, a time i veću moć odlučivanja, osjećaju se bliže Europi, u usporedbi s 
onima koji se nalaze niže na skali zanimanja. Zanimljivo je da postoje i pozitivne korelacije 
između privrženosti Europi i Hrvatskoj, kao i da ta dva odnosa ne moraju uvijek isključivati 
jedan drugoga. Privrženost Europi ne zamjenjuje nacionalnu identifikaciju nego više može 
biti promatrana kao proces širenja identiteta. Zaključujemo da europska identifikacije nije 
negacija nego proširenje nacionalnoga identiteta.
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Appendix






– Survival of your nation is the main goal of every individual.
– Everyone has all they need when the country is strong.
– Without leaders, every nation is like a man without a head.
– The common origin of our people is the basis for social trust.
– The peasant is the best protector of the nation.
– A nation that does not honor their traditions deserves to perish.
– We get our dignity when we fight for our country.
– The past of our people for all of us must be a secret holy object.
– Every inch of our country should be treated as a secret holy object.
– The nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable then others.
– Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation.
– Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust.
– In choosing a spouse, nationality should be one of the most important considerations.
– Every nation should have its own state.
– It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one nationality.




– Abortion should be illegal.
– It is wrong for couples to live together without being married.
– Divorce should be prohibited by law.
– Homosexuals are no better than criminals and should be punished in the extreme. 
Isolationism:
1–5
– Croatia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
–  For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce 
solution.
– Croatia should follow its own interests, even it this leads to conflicts with other nations.
– Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Croatia.
– Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in Croatia.
– Free trade leads to better products becoming available in Croatia.
– In general, Croatia should follow decisions of international organizations to which it belongs.
– Increase exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.
– International organizations are taking away too much power from the Croatian government.
Religiosity:
0–10
– How religious would you say you are?
Proud to be Croat:
1–5
– I would rather be a citizen of Croatia than of any other country in the world.
– There are some things about Croatia today that makes me feel ashamed.
– The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Croats.
– I am often less proud of Croatia than I would like to be.
